D. Interviewing jurors

Petit jurors. The court’s interest in the administration of justice generally trumps any speech interests during trial, and courts have the authority to prevent the press from interviewing jurors about the proceedings. For example, the court in In re Stone, 703 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Colo. App. 1985), held that “once the trial process had begun, [the media’s] First Amendment rights did not extend to permit communication with prospective jurors who had been admonished not to discuss the pending case.” But “the threat to justice caused by news media contact with jurors is much lower after trial than it is during trial.” Journal Pub. Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986).

Post-verdict limitations on interviewing jurors are presumptively invalid prior restraints on speech, and the party seeking a no-contact order “must show that the activity restrained poses a clear and present danger or a serious and imminent threat to a protected competing interest; the restraint must be narrowly drawn and no reasonable alternatives, having a lesser impact on First Amendment freedoms, must be available.” United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978) (internal citations omitted).

Courts have occasionally approved narrowly tailored orders in unusual cases, especially limitations on repeated requests for interviews or discussions of jury deliberations or other juror’s votes. The court in Journal Pub. Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986), for example, held that a trial court could permissibly tell “jurors not to discuss the specific votes and opinions of noninterviewed jurors in order to encourage free deliberation in the jury room.” And in United States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114, 1118 (5th Cir. 1983), the court upheld an order that prohibited repeated requests for interviews or inquiries “into the specific vote of any juror other than the juror being interviewed.” The court is also free to instruct them that “[a] juror may speak or remain silent as he desires.” United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361, 1362 (9th Cir. 1978).

Grand jurors. The rule governing federal grand jury secrecy, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), places no restriction on witnesses. These rules recognize the Supreme Court’s admonition in Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 626 (1990), that witnesses have a First Amendment right to publish the details of their grand jury testimony. In that case, the Court held that “insofar as the Florida law prohibits a grand jury witness from disclosing his own testimony after the term of the grand jury has ended, it violates the First Amendment,” reasoning that “the interests advanced by the portion of the Florida statute struck down are not sufficient to overcome respondent’s First Amendment right to make a truthful statement of information he acquired on his own.” Id. at 626, 636.

Some courts, however, have narrowly interpreted Butterworth to permit grand jury witnesses to divulge only what they knew before they testified, drawing a line “between information the witness possessed prior to becoming a witness and information the witness gained through her actual participation in the grand jury process.” Hoffmann-Pugh v. Keenan, 338 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 2003).

The Tenth Circuit has recognized that trial courts cannot “issue a sweeping restraint forbidding all contact between the press and former jurors without a compelling reason.” Journal Publ’g Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting that a narrowly tailored order instructing “jurors not to discuss the specific votes and opinions of noninterviewed jurors in order to encourage free deliberation in the jury room” would be acceptable).

In National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Cleland, a U.S. district court in Georgia’s Northern District adopted the 5th, 9th and 10th Circuit holdings that "trial court orders preventing the media from interviewing jurors regarding their verdicts and deliberations violate the First Amendment rights of the press and the jurors themselves.” 697 F. Supp. 1204, 1214-215 (N.D. Ga 1988) (citing with approval In re Express News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir. 1982); Journal Publ’g Co. v. Mecham, 801 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978)).

After trial has concluded, district courts in the First Circuit may allow the public access to information sufficient to identify and interview petit jurors.  See United States v. Chin, 913 F.3d 251 (1st Cir. 2019).  The identity of grand jurors is not public.

The Second Circuit has not issued a definitive ruling as to interviewing jurors.  This will vary by jurisdiction.

The Third Circuit has not addressed the propriety of court-ordered restrictions on press interviews of jurors.

There is no general prohibition on the media interviewing jurors.

The right of a party to interview jurors is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 606, which “prohibit[s] the interrogation of jurors except with regard to ‘whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.’” United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1988).

The federal courts have generally disfavored post-verdict interviews of jurors. Haeberle v. Texas Int’l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019, 1020 (5th Cir. 1984). This disfavor is primarily directed at counsel and not at journalists, since counsel are not seeking interviews in order to serve the public’s right to know. Id. But see Benson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 889 F.3d 233, 235 (5th Cir. 2018) (arguing that Haberle’s distinction between the First Amendment rights of the press and those of the public at large “finds no support in either constitutional text or precedent,” and further advising district courts to “consider seriously whether there exists any genuine government interest in preventing attorneys from conversing with consenting jurors”). However, the accused’s right to a fair trial and jurors’ interest in privacy and protection from harassment can outweigh the press’s First Amendment rights in certain circumstances. Haeberle, 739 F.2d at 1020.

Jurors, even after completing their service, are entitled to privacy and to protection against harassment. United States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114, 1116 (5th Cir. 1985). For these and other reasons, the Fifth Circuit has upheld various restrictions on interviewing jurors. Among these are that a court could order jurors not to speak about jury deliberations, United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 920-21 (5th Cir. 2001); a court could ask jurors if they wished to remain anonymous and instruct them that they were under no obligation to discuss the case with the media, id. at 921; a court could ban the media from repeatedly requesting (“wheedling and importuning”) interviews after a juror had expressed his or her desire not to be interviewed, Harrelson, 713 F.2d at 1117; a court could prohibit media inquiries into the specific vote of any juror other than the juror being interviewed, id.;and a court could forbid counsel from interviewing jurors post-verdict without the court’s permission. Haeberle, 739 F.2d at 1020.

Despite these decisions, not all restrictions on juror interviews are permissible in the Fifth Circuit. Restrictions must be limited in scope. Therefore while, a court could order jurors not to discuss deliberations (deliberations being defined as discussions and debates about the case that occurred within the sanctity of the jury room—United States v. Cleveland, 128 F.3d 267, 270 (5th Cir. 1997))—a court cannot order jurors not to discuss any aspect of the case or the verdict with the media. United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 920–21 (5th Cir. 2001). Prohibiting any and all discussion would be overbroad, and a violation of the jurors’ and the media’s First Amendment rights, as would an order that prohibits relatives, friends, and associates from talking to the media. In re Express News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1982); cf. Benson, 889 F.3d at 236 (Graves, J., concurring) (arguing that the local rule was “very likely impermissibly overbroad” since the rule “bars all speech on any subject in perpetuity between an attorney and any juror on a case previously tried by that attorney without first seeking leave of court”).

Unlike most trial closure orders, a court does not have to conduct an evidentiary hearing or make fact-findings in order to impose limitations on the media’s ability to question a jury post-verdict. Harrelson, 713 F.2d at 1116. This is because the court considered it relatively obvious that, in particularly newsworthy cases, reporters are persistent in pursuing information regarding the nonpublic portions of legal proceedings. Id.

As for grand jury interviews, the Fifth Circuit has not specifically addressed the question, but the Circuit has repeatedly affirmed the general rule of secrecy for grand jury proceedings. The Fifth Circuit has also noted that it is doubtful that a court should ever order that grand jury members submit to examinations, even in civil cases where it might be of considerable value to one or both of the parties. Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 147 (5th Cir. 2004).

In In re Petitions of Memphis Publishing Co., 887 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1989), the district court asked jurors not to speak about a criminal case that had drawn “mammoth pretrial publicity.”  Id. at 648.  After being rebuked by jurors they sought to interview, the media challenged the district court’s action via motion, which was denied without explanation.  On appeal, the court remanded “for clarification, mindful of the fact that if the trial court’s statement were indeed a post-trial judicial gag order of the scope alleged by [the media], it would trammel First Amendment values, and thus fail to pass Constitutional muster.”  Id. at 649.

In United States v. Blagojevich, No. 08 CR 888, 2011 WL 812116 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2011), the district judge presiding over the high-profile trial of Illinois Governor Blagojevich ordered that the names of jurors would not be released until the next calendar day after the verdict was announced; the judge observed that in a prior trial, “[m]ost jurors reported that media were waiting outside their homes before they arrived home” and that “[o]ne juror who refused to give an interview was subjected to several hours of phone calls, and someone from the media knocked on her door at regular intervals until almost midnight.”  Id. at *1.  The court agreed to provide a “courthouse space for jurors who are willing to meet with the press to do so immediately after the verdict,” but observed that in the prior trial “not one juror was willing to meet with the media immediately after the verdict.”  Id. at *1 n. 1.

There appears to be no Eighth Circuit case law discussing media interviews with jurors.

The Alabama Code provides that “[n]o past or present grand juror . . . shall willfully at any time . . . reveal, disclose or divulge or attempt or endeavor to reveal, disclose or divulge or cause to be revealed, disclosed or divulged, any knowledge or information pertaining to any grand juror’s questions, considerations, debates, deliberations, opinions or votes on any case, evidence, or other matter taken within or occurring before any grand jury of this state.” Ala. Code § 12-16-215 (2019). Additionally, “[n]o past or present grand juror . . . shall willfully . . . reveal, disclose or divulge or endeavor to reveal, disclose or divulge or cause to be revealed, disclosed or divulged, any knowledge of the form, nature or content of any physical evidence presented to any grand jury of this state or any knowledge of the form, nature or content of any question propounded to any person within or before any grand jury or any comment made by any person in response thereto or any other evidence, testimony or conversation occurring or taken therein.” Ala. Code § 12-16-216 (2019).

As a practical matter, the principal determinant of whether journalists are able to interview jurors, after a trial is over, will be what individual jurors choose to do.  Jurors discharged at the conclusion of a trial will typically be told by a trial judge that they are free to speak if they wish but are under no obligation to do so. (The local rules of the federal district court expressly provide for “Juror’s Rights:” “Except in response to a court order, jurors have a right to decline to communicate with anyone concerning any trial or deliberations in which the juror has been a participant.” D. Alaska Local R. 39.5(c)). Case law and court rules primarily address contacts with jurors by attorneys and their agents, for reasons that relate to the administration of justice, and presumably do not apply to impose any restrictions on interviews of jurors by journalists.  The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized that it's appropriate to talk to released jurors, and that interviewing jurors after their discharge is “a common practice of trial attorneys” and does not constitute “improper conduct” or “jury tampering.”  Patterson v. Cox, 2017 WL 5999883 *2 (Alaska Nov. 29, 2017). But cf. Marsingill v. O’Malley, 58 P.3d 495, 505 n. 27 (Alaska 2002) (trial counsel prohibited from questioning jurors as to any matter influencing their deliberations other than items covered by exceptions). Alaska Evidence Rule 606(b) allows attorneys to question jurors concerning outside influences on their deliberations—for example, fraud, bribery, threats or coercion by third parties, or other acts of third parties in obstruction of justice—but not about things that can’t affect the validity of a verdict or indictment. In the past, attorneys and their agents have sometimes been restricted from contacting jurors after a trial is concluded without permission of the court, but that is generally no longer the case. See, e.g., as to state courts, Elisovsky v. State, 592 P.2d 1221, 1228–29 (Alaska 1979). As to federal courts, applying the analogous Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), compare Dietzmann v. City of Homer, 2013 WL 12303127, *1 (D. Alaska May 9, 2013) (former local rule requiring attorneys to obtain prior approval of the court for “any contact or interview with any juror relating to any case in which the attorney has entered an appearance”) with current D. Alaska Local Civ. R. 39.5 (after a trial jury concludes its deliberations and has been discharged, people who by court rule are prohibited from contacting or communicating with jurors or prospective jurors or their families before or during trial—parties, attorneys, or other interested persons—are free to contact or communicate with jurors unless otherwise ordered by the court). While this is a civil rule, D. Alaska Local Civ. R. 81.1 provides that “these rules may be applied in admiralty, bankruptcy, criminal, or habeas proceedings, to the degree their application is not inconsistent with those rules or with statutes governing those proceedings.”

The media is not permitted to interview trial participants while the proceedings are ongoing.  See KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 256, 678 P.2d 431, 441 (1984) (“[I]nterviewing trial participants falls outside of the right of access.”).  If a juror consents, the media may interview that individual after the jury has been discharged.  See Ariz. R. Supreme Ct. 122(k)(2).

Code of Civil Procedure § 237 establishes the procedure to obtain juror identities. Under Section 237(a)(1), “[t]he names of qualified jurors drawn from the qualified juror list for the superior court shall be made available to the public upon request unless the court determines that a compelling interest … requires that this information should be kept confidential or its use limited in whole or in part.” The statute directs the court to give notice to jurors, who may request that their identities not be disclosed, and requires release if the petition is supported by “good cause” and no compelling interests support continue sealing. The trial court has broad discretion to decide whether or not to grant access if any juror objects. See People v. Zamora, 73 Cal. App. 5th 1084, 1091-1092, 288 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878 (2022).

Although courts may have some authority to limit parties and attorneys from contacting jurors, the First Amendment prohibits such restrictions on the press. See Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 4th 862, 867-868, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 69 (1998). Journalists may attempt to interview jurors, and a “juror may speak or remain silent as he or she desires.” Id. at 868.

In In re Stone, 703 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Colo. App. 1985), the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that “once the trial process had begun, [the media’s] First Amendment rights did not extend to permit communications with prospective jurors who had been admonished not to discuss the pending case.”  The court stated that “the press, through its news gathering activities, had engaged in conduct which seriously threatened to interfere with a defendant’s due process rights to receive a trial by an impartial jury free of outside influences.”  Id. at 1321.  In that case, during pre-trial proceedings, the prospective jurors were seated at the same table as the criminal defendant and were asked about their views about putting the defendant to death.  Id. at 1320.  Members of the media later contacted four members of the jury who had been preliminarily qualified in order to determine if they had been intimidated by the defendant’s presence and the death penalty voir dire. Id.  The trial court did not impose punitive sanctions against the media, but ordered the respondents to reimburse the parties for costs of four additional days of the criminal trial, because the jury selection process had to be repeated. Id. at 1321.

In both federal and state court, sitting jurors are not permitted to speak about their deliberations.  D. Conn. Local R. 83.5(1)(b) (federal); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-245(a) (state).

Extreme caution should be used when considering contacting sitting federal grand jurors, as contact could be viewed as a crime if characterized as an attempt to influence the juror.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1504.  Jurors who have completed their service may not speak about their deliberations.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(B)(i).  Grand jury witnesses, however, may speak freely about their testimony after the end of the grand jury’s term unless specifically barred from doing so by a court.  Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 632–33 (1990).

In United States v. Espy, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998), juror's names were sealed for seven days after their return of verdict, after which the names were released, and the press was free to contact them.

A D.C. federal district court recognized the  holding from Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990), that grand jury witnesses have the right to “discuss any prior testimony [they] gave to a grand jury whose investigation is completed.” North v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 658 F. Supp. 2d 163, 177 (D.D.C. 2009). However, the court refused to extend that right to encompass access by the witness to a copy of his grand jury subpoena. See id. at 176-78 (holding that the Executive Office for the U.S. Attorneys properly invoked FOIA Exemption 3 in denying former grand jury witness’s request for a copy of a grand jury subpoena issued to him in a previous trial because “disclosure of a subpoena would constitute official confirmation of [his] involvement and reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury proceedings”).

Petit Jurors: Limitations on the speech of petit jurors or the media to speak to petit jurors are treated as prior restraints and are presumptively unconstitutional. See Sentinel Communications Co. v. Watson, 615 So. 2d 768, 772–73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).

Grand Jurors: Section 905.27, Florida Statutes, prohibits grand jurors, state attorneys and all other court personnel from disclosing to anyone, except under certain narrowly-specified circumstances, the testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury or other evidence received by it. The statute declares it unlawful:

for any person knowingly to publish, broadcast, disclose, divulge, or communicate to any other person, . . . in any manner whatsoever, any testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury, or the content, gist, or import thereof, except when such testimony is or has been disclosed in a court proceeding.

§ 905.27(2), Fla. Stat. Violation of this provision is a first-degree misdemeanor. Fla. Stat. § 905.27(4). A similar provision restrains the speech of statewide grand juries, which have specific, limited jurisdiction. § 905.395, Fla. Stat. Violation of this provision is a third-degree felony. Id.

There is no general rule in Georgia prohibiting post-verdict interviews of members of a jury. See generally Sears v. State, 268 Ga. 759 (1997) (“Anyone seeking to speak with a juror must clearly inform that juror that he or she has the right to choose to answer questions and the right to decline the request”).

Generally, at the end of all jury trials in Idaho, judges instruct jurors “that whether you talk to the attorneys or to anyone else is entirely your own decision.  It is proper for you to discuss this case if you wish to but you are not required to do so and you may choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all.  If you choose to talk to someone about this case you may tell them as much or as little as you like about your deliberations or the facts that influenced your decisions.”  IDJI2d 1.17.  The court also instructs jurors to contact it if “anyone persists in discussing the case over your objection or becomes critical of your service.”  Id.  In contrast, grand jurors are not permitted to discuss “whatever was said or done in grand jury proceedings and which manner each grand juror may have voted on a matter before them.”  Idaho Crim. R. 6.4(c).

The issue of post-verdict contact between defense attorneys and jurors in a capital murder case came before the Idaho Supreme Court in Hall v. State, 151 Idaho 42, 253 P.3d 716 (2011).  There, attorneys for a criminal defendant who had been found guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping and rape and sentenced to death sought permission to interview jurors post-trial.  The trial court denied such motion, and the attorneys appealed arguing that in the absence of a statute or rule prohibiting such contact, the trial court’s order violated their First Amendment rights.  The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s order prohibiting such contact with jurors, finding that trial courts have “inherent authority to enter an order restricting contact with the jury, including post-verdict contact.”  Id. at 46, 253 P.3d at 720.  The Court recognized that the attorneys had limited First Amendment rights, but such rights were outweighed by the public policy interests in preserving a full and fair trial, protecting juror privacy and protecting the finality of verdicts.  Id. at 48, 253 P.3d at 722.

In Illinois, grand jurors may not disclose grand jury materials and may be held in contempt for doing so improperly. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/112-6(d) (West 2022). However, a witness can choose to disclose what she said in her testimony. See Grand Jury No. 655, 84 Ill. App. 3d at 852, 405 N.E.2d at 1180, 40 Ill. Dec. at 88.

There are circumstances under which jurors may not disclose information about a case. Jury Rule 29 provides that, if the jurors are separated during deliberations, they shall not discuss the case with anyone. Jury Rule 29. Likewise, Indiana Code Section 35-34-2-4(i) prohibits anyone who attends a grand jury proceeding from disclosing the nature or substance of the testimony or any decision, result, or other matter in the proceeding. Further, anyone present at a grand jury proceeding who knowingly or intentionally discloses evidence produced, what a juror said,

There is no formal prohibition in Iowa, however, some local rules may prohibit juror interviews. In addition, contempt citations may be threatened if the press contacts a juror after impaneling but prior to discharge.

Kansas courts generally preclude jurors from being interviewed by journalists during trial.  A bar association guide for jurors says they

"should not use social media to talk about the trial or express any views while the case is pending. Jurors must try to avoid and never let TV, radio, newspaper or internet articles on the trial affect any decision. They may be incomplete or biased and a miscarriage of justice could result. During the trial, do not read, view, or listen to news reports or search the internet relating to the case or trial."

A Juror’s Rights and Responsibilities, Kansas Bar Association, https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.ksbar.org/resource/resmgr/Public_Services/pamphlets/jurors_rights_responsibilities/JurorsRightsResponsibilities.pdf.

Model instruction to jurors in criminal cases have included one saying:  “[Y]ou must not communicate with anyone about this case or your jury service, and you must not allow anyone to communicate with you.”  See 50.010 Instruction for Impaneled Jurors, Pattern Instructions Kansas – Criminal 2012, Kansas Judicial Council.

For jurors in civil cases, model instructions have included one saying:

"Until all of the evidence has been presented and the final instructions given by the judge, jurors must not discuss the case among themselves or with anyone else, including anyone outside the courthouse. If anyone attempts to talk with a juror about the case, the juror should tell this person that such conversation is not proper and should cease. The juror should also report the matter to the bailiff at the earliest opportunity."

101.02 Handbook for Jurors/IX. Conduct of the Jury During Trial, Pattern Instructions Kansas – Civil 2011, Kansas Judicial Council.

Participants in proceedings of a Kansas grand jury generally are prohibited from making disclosures.  They “may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury.” K.S.A. 22-3012.  Kansas appellate courts have not specifically addressed whether K.S.A. 22-3012 is intended to silence participants in grand jury proceedings after the grand jury’s session has ended.  The Kansas Supreme Court only has indicated that it may narrowly construe K.S.A. 22-3012, which says, “No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any person except in accordance with this rule.”  See State ex rel. Brant v. Bank of America, 31 P.3d 952, 956 (Kan.  2001).

In 2006, a Kansas district court judge issued a protective order to prevent media access to grand jurors.  An evangelical group successfully had petitioned to empanel the grand jury after raising concerns about allegedly pornographic enterprises.  The judge who issued the protective order told the jurors, “It was ‘extremely important’ not to tell family members, friends, reporters or anyone else about grand jury business, saying disclosure could allow someone to escape, allow destruction of evidence and damage an innocent person.  Confidentiality also is to protect jurors from ‘improper contacts.’”  Steve Fry, Rare Grand Jury Chosen, Topeka Capital-Journal (June 8, 2006).

In this case, In re Grand Jury Petition, 2006 WL 1620461 (Kan. Dist. Ct. 2006), the judge observed that the press customarily is excluded from grand jury proceedings, citing Brangburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684–85 (1972), and that grand jury secrecy is “‘indispensable’ to the administration of justice,” citing United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943).  Privacy and safety of the grand jurors are “of paramount importance,” the judge said.  He ordered the media not to photograph or interview grand jurors while they were in session and not to enter the grand jury room.  The judge also prohibited news reporters from making “reports to their news agencies” in the vicinity of the grand jury on “any day in which it was in session.”  In re Grand Jury Petition, 2006 WL 1620461 at *1–2.

Kentucky law recognizes the right of the news media to contact and attempt to interview jurors as well as the right of jurors to refuse to speak with news media representatives.  Cape Publ’ns, Inc. v. Braden, 39 S.W.3d 823 (Ky. 2001).  A court order restricting the news media’s right to contact jurors constitutes a prior restraint on news gathering and can only be justified by “a compelling governmental interest” and must be “narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”  Id. at 826.

There are no Louisiana statutes or reported cases on this subject.

Any contact with jurors by the parties before, during, or after trial is prohibited absent an order of the court.

In Butterworth v. Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a statute prohibiting in perpetuity a grand jury witness from disclosing his testimony violated the First Amendment. 494 U.S. 624, 632 (1990) (holding that interest in grand jury secrecy does not “warrant a permanent ban on the disclosure by a witness of his own testimony once a grand jury has been discharged”). The Maryland courts have not considered the application of Butterworth to Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings, § 8-507, which prohibits grand jury witnesses from disclosing the “content” of a grand jury proceeding.

The Maryland courts have likewise not had occasion to consider the right of the press to interview petit jurors.

The Michigan Court of Appeals has recognized that an order prohibiting contact with jurors immediately after trial was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction that did not violate the First Amendment. See People v. Ackerman, 2001 WL 732062 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).

The Minnesota Court of Appeals has held that “[a]ccess to records revealing the identities of jurors may be denied only in the ‘interest of justice,’ upon a showing of ‘exceptional circumstances peculiar to the case.’” State v. Stewart, No. C4-92-1321, 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 1278, *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1992) (citing Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 814(a) and In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 97 (1st Cir. 1990); granting petition for writ of prohibition and requiring disclosure of juror identities). It has also held that there is a First Amendment interest in access that cannot be overcome by “[t]he individual preferences of jurors to remain anonymous.” Id. *1–2.

As the Stewart court recognized, the names and addresses of jurors in criminal trials are specifically and expressly made accessible to the public by rules promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme Court, including Rules 2 and 4 of the Rules of Public Access to Records of the Judicial Branch (setting forth a presumption of access), Rule 814 of the General Rules of Practice for District Courts (discussing prospective jurors and their questionnaires), and Rules 25.03 and 26.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure (setting forth rules for restricting access).

Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02 sets forth the requirements for restricting access to jurors’ names, addresses, telephone numbers, and other identifying information. Among other things, the court must find a “strong reason to believe that the jury needs protection from external threats to its members’ safety or impartiality.”

Petit jurors. The court’s interest in the administration of justice generally trumps any speech interests during trial, and courts have the authority to prevent the press from interviewing jurors about the proceedings.

In United States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d1114, 1118 (5th Cir. 1983), the court upheld an order that prohibited repeated requests for interviews or inquiries “into the specific vote of any juror other than the juror being interviewed.”

Grand jurors. The rule governing federal grand jury secrecy, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), places no restriction on witnesses. These rules recognize the Supreme Court’s admonition in Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 626 (1990), that witnesses have a First Amendment right to publish the details of their grand jury testimony. In that case, the Court held that “insofar as the Florida law prohibits a grand jury witness from disclosing his own testimony after the term of the grand jury has ended, it violates the First Amendment,” reasoning that “the interests advanced by the portion of the Florida statute struck down are not sufficient to overcome respondent’s First Amendment right to make a truthful statement of information he acquired on his own.” Id. at 626, 636.

The court usually leaves it up to the juror to decide whether to permit an interview.

There is no Nebraska law on interviewing petit jurors. Grand jurors swear an oath to keep their deliberations secret unless called upon to make disclosures in court. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1404 and 1405 (Reissue 2016).

Jurors may be interviewed but there is no right to interview.

Although New Mexico courts have not spoken directly to the issues of interviewing petit and grand jurors, the Tenth Circuit has addressed both.  In Journal Pub. Co. v. Mechem, the court held that “the threat to justice caused by news media contact with jurors is much lower after trial than it is during trial.” 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986). There, the Tenth Circuit determined that the trial court could permissibly tell “jurors not to discuss the specific votes and opinions of noninterviewed jurors in order to encourage free deliberation in the jury room.” Id. New Mexico courts have not spoken directly on the permissibility nor outlined the contours of interviewing on courthouse grounds. In state court, jurors are regularly approached for interviews following a trial, although judges regularly inform them that they have no obligation to discuss the trial with the media. Per New Mexico Court Rules, neither the jury nor any member of the jury may be filmed in or near the courtroom, nor shall the jury selection process be filmed. Rule 23-107(A)(3) NMRA.​

The public does not have the right to access the following records, as specified in N.D. Sup. Ct. R. 41: names of qualified or summoned jurors and contents of jury qualification forms if disclosure is prohibited or restricted by order of the court; and records of voir dire of jurors, unless disclosure is permitted by court order or rule.

A trial judge cannot ban jurors from media interviews after the verdict.  State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton Cty., 570 N.E.2d 1101, 1105 (Ohio 1991).  However, the trial judge may “instruct the jurors that they have no obligation to discuss the case with anyone . . . [and] forbid reporters to pester jurors for interviews once the jurors have refused to talk.”  Id. at 1103.

Of course, the media are prevented from communicating with jurors during the course of the trial.  In both civil and criminal cases, jurors are instructed upon their discharge that “[t]he question may arise whether you are free to discuss this case with anyone.  That is entirely your decision.”  Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction (Civil)–3d 1.8; Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction (Criminal) 10–12.  Grand jury witnesses are commonly thought to be free to discuss their testimony after being discharged.

In Commonwealth v. Genovese, 487 A.2d 364, 368-69 (Pa. Super. 1985), the Superior Court struck down an order temporarily enjoining members of the press from interviewing jurors in a high-profile murder trial. While the court held that the order, which would automatically dissolve upon the completion of the trial, was not a prior restraint, it nonetheless concluded that there was no evidence showing that the order “was necessary to protect the jurors or to guarantee a fair trial.”

Rhode Island Courts have not addressed the extent to which the public or media may interview jurors.  The recent case of LMG R.I. Holdings, Inc. v. R.I. Super. Ct. from the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island involved a Superior Court judge who forbade media from interviewing the jurors following a murder trial, and attempted to limit disclosure of a list of jurors to the press.  See No. 18-cv-297-SJM-AKJ, 2019 WL 1865121 at *1 (D.R.I. Apr. 24, 2019).  The judge admitted her error and released the list in the midst of litigation, and the district court ultimately held that the plaintiff, a newspaper publisher, was therefore no longer entitled to relief.  Id. at *2.

South Carolina does not have a rule prohibiting the press from speaking with jurors when a case has concluded. But, jurors should not before submission of the case converse with outsiders or among themselves on any subject connected with the trial or form or express any opinion thereabout; the court should admonish jurors not to discuss the case when they are permitted to separate during trial. State v. Aldret, 327 S.C. 282 (Ct. App. 1997).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that the right of a party to interview jurors is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 606, which “prohibit[s] the interrogation of jurors except with regard to ‘whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.’” United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1988).

There are no statutory restrictions on petit jurors. S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-5-16 prohibits a juror, witness or court officer from disclosing grand jury “matters.”

Tennessee courts have not considered the right of the press to interview jurors or veniremen.

Generally, the press has a right “to interview willing, discharged jurors, except when outweighed by a compelling government interest, such as the need to protect the sanctity of jury deliberations, a juror’s right to privacy and to be free from harassment, or a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.”  In re Hearst Newspapers P’ship, L.P., 241 S.W.3d 190, 195 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding).  Gag orders that are not designed to protect a compelling government interest are generally unconstitutional.  See id. at 196.

No Utah authority specifically addresses access to interviewing jurors.

Under the Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure, grand jury proceedings are closed from the public and grand jurors “must not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury.”   V.R.Cr.P. Rule 6(e)(2)(B). Moreover, members of a grand jury in Vermont take a statutorily-prescribed oath to keep deliberations of the grand jury secret.  12 V.S.A. § 5802. Thus, grand jurors may not be interviewed.

There is no prohibition against petit jurors giving interviews after the trial has concluded.

In Virginia, there is no general prohibition on interviewing jurors by third-parties.

However, there may be restrictions on the parties’ ability to interview jurors. Rule 2:606 of Virginia’s Rules of Evidence is identical to Rule 606 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which the Fourth Circuit has held “prohibit[s] the interrogation of jurors except with regard to ‘whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.’” United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)).

West Virginia’s Trial Court Rule 4.09 prohibits parties and their attorneys (but not journalists or other non-parties) from communicating with any member of the juror’s immediate family without first applying for and obtaining an order, until the juror has been excused from the particular term of court. W. Va. Trial Ct. R. 4.09. The rule allows circuit courts to “liberally grant” such requests and states the requests shall contain a description of the proposed contact. Id.

There is no prohibition in Wisconsin on interviewing jurors after their service is completed.  Wis JI-Civil 197,  "Instruction After Verdict Is Received":

Your service in this case is completed.  Many jurors ask if they are allowed to discuss the case with others after receipt of the verdict.  Because your role in the case is over, you are not prohibited from discussing the case with anyone.  However, you should know that you do not have to discuss the case with anyone or answer any questions about it from anyone other than the court.  This includes the parties, lawyers, the media, or anyone else.

Jurors may be interviewed after the conclusion of the trial in Wyoming, but if a juror objects, then the interviewer must not persist in the interview.